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CLASS IN WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. (\ -
This paper sketches the broad lines of class structure in the white community in
South Africa. Aside from the efforts of a small group of scholars, this issue
has not received the attention it deserves in recent years. Indeed there is an
implicit assumption that because there are no class parties, class is a negligible
factor in white politics.
While a general discussion of the literature is beyond the scope of this paper,
the major assumptions which are embedded in recent analyses by liberal and
conservative historians and sociologists might be Summarised briefly as follows:
Whites are members of a broadly egalitarian caste divided politically along language
and cultural lines within a system of racial stratification. Political power
•\ reflects cultural groupings rather than class formations. Political elites are
the representatives of cultural formations rather than dominant class interests.
Class and community constitute alternative and exclusive bases for political action.
Racial prejudice is seen as the determinant force in the present configuration of
power.
Because it has been empirically established that the majority of Afrikaners are
more "prejudiced" than the English, and that lower-class whites are more "prejudiced"
than upper- and middle-class groups, it is easy to conclude that the sources of
power and of prejudice are the same. This variation on the thesis of working-
class authoritarianism supports the case that the mass of whites dictate the major
political decisions in the society. The irrationality of racism has its sources
in the irrationality of the average white.
)
While the empirical findings which support such conclusions may be accurate, they
conceal the fundamental dimension of the structure of power in South Africa.
Hegemony resides in the great interests — mining, agriculture, manufacturing
industry — which drive the engines of capitalist production and investment, and
in the political institutions which maintain and protect those interests. White
workers and the rural lower classes, civil servants, soldiers, policemen,
urban wage- and salary earners provide the mass support for these dominant
interests. But they do not dictate the major political decisions in state and
economy, nor do they affect the framework within which these decisions are taken.
It is sometimes argued that white workers achieved "power" in the great conflicts
between capital and labour during the 1920*s. The opposite would be nearer the
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truth. The "rapprochement" between capital and labour which was reached after the
Rand revolt had been crushed gave white workers protection from black competition
and thus laid the foundations for the relative prosperity of white workers. But an
equally important effect was that white workers were eclipsed as a significant
political force. The body of legislation which consolidated the peace in industrial
relations made it difficult for white workers to use the central device of working
class action — the strike. Perhaps more important (for legislation is never entirely
effective against determined resistance) the strike became largely otiose as an
instrument of trade union action. Conflicts between capital and white
labour would be reconciled through the machinery of the Industrial Conciliation Act
in a system in which the state actively participated.
The effect was to diminish the political functions of white worker organisation.
As in other capitalist societies, white workers were incorporated into the capitalist*
system through the institutional separation of economy and polity. The consequence
was the consolidation of the hegemonic role of capital. White workers became co-
opted into the ensemble of capitalist enterprise. Their cooperation in economic
development became an important factor in the expansion of industry under capitalist
auspices.
Certain political institutions became critically important in engineering the basis
of consent among whites. Political parties, with minor exceptions, have been
parties of property and business. Ideological disputes among them have ranged over
a wide area, reflecting the conflicts of interest between dominant groups. But the
key institutions of capitalism have never been the subject of a systematic attack
or of far -reaching proposals for reform. It is true that parties have attacked s
specific capitalist interests — the mining interest has provided a favourite target —
and in doing so have attracted support from lower-class whites. Indeed it was
precisely in this way that mass support for the institutions of capitalism was co-
opted.
The groups which have made these attacks have normally acted on behalf of rival
capitalist interests, and in such a way as to preserve the hegemony of capital.
White workers have frequently been the beneficiaries of these conflicts. Indeed
white workers have gained some representation in political parties of the right.
But this representation has been nominal rather than real. Workers were incorporated
on the condition that they accepted the basic framework of capitalist power. The
Labour Party alone contained socialist elements, but these had begun to move outside
of the orbit of legitimate politics by the end of the First World War. The elements
which remained in the party, and came to dominate it as it declined, were with few
3/...
-3-
exceptions reformist rather than revolutionary, oriented towards trade unionist
activity, and by and large uncritical of capitalism in a systematic way.
Closely aligned to the parties was an array of cultural groups which included trade
unions under the umbrella of their associated organisations. These became particularly
important in organising the great waves of urbanising Afrikaners for middle-class
leadership. A key function of these cultural groups was to minimise class conflict.
In sum, despite wide variations in objectives, interests and methods,the dominant
political institutions have worked to reduce the possibility of class conflicts
among whites. The consequence of this collective effort has been to deflate, divert,
fragment, and canalise conflicts in directions which have served to maintain the
basic fabric of capitalist institutions and to create the political infra-structure
necessary for economic expansion.
The effort has been largely successful. Political movements on the left, even of
a moderately reformist character have had little appeal among whites. Few white
workers allied themselves with the opposition to proscribe the Communist Party in
1952. The white working class has by and large supported subsequent attacks on
left-wing political organisations.
This brief preamble seems necessary in order to clarify the scope of this paper.
Aspects of the political relationships between classes will, hopefully, be discussed
in a later paper. The concern here is to delineate the core of class relationships —
the distribution of rewards between different groups, and the relationship between the
source and size of rewards.
It is not the intention to "define" class at this point. Rather it is hoped that
the paper will suggest the value of class analysis in delineating political relation-
ships. The problem of what constitutes the essence of these, relationships will be left
open. The trend in the most valuable recent contributions to class analysis would
seem to me to be the one that insists (i) that the problem is not to be whether one
can or cannot speak of classes, but of the extent to which class consciousness is
exhibited in political situations; (ii) which recognises that even those situations
in which class antagonisms are muted or non-existent are pivoted (in capitalist
societies at least) on specific class relationships; (iii) which recognises that
classes are not strata, nor are they specific entities like institutions.
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The guide-lines I have tried to observe in discussing white classes are not limited
to trying to specify an economic structure, but rather to understand class as the
product of relationships generated in the market, including political relationships.
The assumption is that the relationships which I try to measure are the social product
of innumerable conflicts, negotiations, determinations and compromises among groups
and institutions.
The paper is based mainly on the report of the Secretary for Inland Revenue for 1950
and 1966, the census report for 1970, and reports of the Department of Labour for
September 1971. (It is unfortunate that more recent reports of the Revenue Department
were not available, but the intention is not to make rigorous comparisons between
different sources. Rather it was hoped to present material reflecting the era of
greatest white prosperity.)
The late 1960's and early 1970's were perhaps the period of greatest white affluence
in South Africa's history. Whatever promise capitalism may hold out to the most
privileged community in the country would seem to have been fulfilled by the 1970's —
while not claiming prophetic insight, it would seem unlikely that such good times
will soon come again.
Indeed, the affluence of whites during this period sustained something of a celebration
in the upper echelons of government and business, including some spokesmen hitherto
fearful of the jeopardy in which material riches placed the spiritual prospects of
the Volk. The signal event in white politics during the late 196Ofs was the
extrusion from the Nationalist Party of the Hertzogites who continued to insist,
against the mainstream of opinion, upon unfashionable theses connecting poverty, (
strife and national virtue. The mainstream itself joined both in the celebration
and the accumulation of secular benefits. The basis of the celebration is the
subject of the paper.
TWO
Compared with blacks, whites in South Africa enjoy a degree of affluence which makes
inequalities between whites seem trivial. Something like five million Africans were
economically active in 1970, according to the census of that year. In 1966, the
Revenue Department assessed the incomes of 3524 Africans, from which it may be concluded
that they constitute an insignificant proportion of individuals paying income tax.
Few whites live in abject poverty. Relatively few are unemployed. The diseases
associated with poverty occur infrequently among whites. A network of social services
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comparable to social security in metropolitan countries mitigate the sufferings of
the white unemployed, aged poor, chronically sick and destitute. Yet the conclusion
which is sometimes drawn that whites constitute a "middle class" community conceals
a number of structural features which are central to the understanding of white
politics.
In particular such a view conceals the presence and significance of a tiny minority
of individuals enjoying a degree of wealth and power disproportionate to their
numbers and the source of this wealth in their command over the institutions of
private property. It also minimises the political significance which may be
attached to the market situation of the majority of whites. The largely unexamined
assumption that whites constitute a '"middle class" or that the affluence of white
' workers rivals that of the property-owning classes conceals the source of conflicts
and alliances. In consequence, factors other than class, such as "language" are
given an exagerated significance. The analysis which follows was not undertaken out
of a sentimental concern to attract attention to the existence of poverty among
whites, (indeed it reinforces the view that most whites enjoy a remarkable degree
of affluence) but rather to delineate the contours of capitalist society as it
affects the most privileged community in the country.
Whites enjoy a considerable range of incomes on the upper slopes of a pyramid
with a tiny apex rather than on the top of a plateau. Moreover, the positions
which they occupy in the income structure are, it will be shown presently, closely
connected with the position they occupy in relation to the ownership of private
^ property. Official data on family incomes gathered for the 1970 census indicate
the wide variations in white incomes. A minority of around five per cent enjoyed
high incomes, while a group of comparable size had very low incomes. The great
majority of family incomes were distributed between these extremes. More than half
of pre-tax family incomes were below R4,000 per annum, and nearly one-fifth were
below R1600. In other words, more than half of white families had incomes of
around one-third of the smallest income of the top twentieth.
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TABLE I:
FAMILY INCOMES OF WHITES
Over RIO,000
R6999 - 9999
R4000 - 5999
R3000 - 3999
R2000 - 2999
R1600 - 1999
R1200 - 1599
R 800 - 1199
R 400 - 799
Under R400
1960
1,39
3.08
7.32
11.05
28.68
16,04
11.12
8.31
7.41
4.23
99.99
1970
4.73
14.25
26.04
20.33
16.76
-
8.57
4.10
2.68
1.76
100.00
Source: 1970 census. A group of families whose incomes
was not known was excluded.
Census material on personal incomes affords substantially with the material on
family incomes. Less than 3 per cent of the pre-tax incomes of gainfully
employed whites exceeded RIO,000 a year, while more than half of all incomes
were below R3,000. One fifth of incomes were below Rl,200. This is particularly
revealing as the census material probably understates the degree of inequality
between different groups. The incomes of farmers, professionals, and businessmen
were net incomes after current expenses - incurred in earning the incomes had been
deducted, while the incomes of salary- and wage-earners were gross incomes before
tax, pension and other deductions. Moreover, the highest income group listed by
the census was RIO,000 and above which lumped together all incomes above the level
of modest affluence, thus concealing the existence of the very rich and the extent
of their wealth.
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TABLE II:
PERSONAL INCOMES, 1970.
Over RIO,000
R6000 - 9999
R4000 - 5999
R3000 - 3999
R25OO - 2999
R2000 - 2499
R1600 - 1999
R1200 - 1599
R 800 - 1199
R 400 - 799
Under R400
2.49
6.22
14.07
17.48
8.78
12.23
8.80
11.54
8.75
5.04
4.70
100.10
Source: 1970 Census. A group classified as
"other" was excluded.
Because the census did not indicate the sources of incomes, it reveals the shadow
rather than the substance of class relationships. However, it provides one
crude index of class in.that it distinguished between the incomes of "employers"
and "employees". It is thus possible to compare roughly the incomes of entre-
preneurial classes and salary - and wage earners.
Over RIO,000
R6000 - 9990
R4000 - 5999
R3000 - 3999
R25OO - 2999
R2000 - 2499
R1600 - 1999
R1200 - 1599
R 800 - 1199
R 400 - 799
Under R400
Employers
11.79
15.29
16.01
14.49
6.25
9.98
4.42
5.93
7.23
5.43
3.18
100.00
TABLE
Employees
1.30
5.06
13.82
17.90
9.11
12.52
9.35
12.16
8.94
5.00
4.90
100.06
III:
Proportion of
Employers
53.68
27.86
12.89
9.39
8.06
9.24
5.69
5.86
9.36
12.19
7.66
Source: 1970
each income
Employees
46.32
72.14
87.11
90.61
91.94
90.08
94.31
94.14
90.64
87.81
92.34
Census.
group.
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
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TABLE 4 :
INCOME
GROUP
Over R17
R16,OOO
R14,000
R12,000
RIO,000
R 9 ,000
R 8 ,000
R 7 ,000
R 6 ,000
R 5 ,000
R 4 , 6 0 0
R 3 ,800
R 3 ,000
R 2 ,400
R 2 ,000
R 1,600
R 1,200
R 1,000
R 600
R 0
Losses
,999
- 17,999
- 15,999
- 13,999
- 11,999
- 9,999
- 8,999
- 7,999
- 6,999
- 5,999
- 4,999
- 4,599
- 3,799
- 2,999
- 2,399
- 1,999
- 1,599
- 1,199
999
599
PERSONS
ASSESSED
I
0 .
0 .
0 .
0 .
0 .
0 .
0 .
0 .
1 .
3 .
1 .
6 .
1 1 .
1 1 .
8,
8
10,
6
13
12
1
100
3
1
2
3
5
4
6
9
7
0
9
4
,2
.5
.5
.6
.4
.5
.4
. 0
.6
. 0
INCOME
(Losses deducted)
%
3.
0 .
1.
1 .
2 .
I-I
2 .
2 .
4 .
6 .
3 .
1 1 .
1 5 ,
12 .
7.
6,
5.
2
4
1
0
99
6
8
1
5
2
5
1
9
4
7
,9
.0
.7
.8
.8
.4
.9
.9
.5
.5
.5
.7
The highest income group (above R17,999 per annum) constituted 0.3 per cent of
persons assessed, but enjoyed 3.'8 per cent of incomes - nearly 13 times the
share of incomes they would have enjoyed were incomes equally distributed.
The top 1 per cent obtained 7 per cent, the top 5 per cent 16 per cent, and the
top 10 per cent 42 per cent of all incomes. The bottom one-fifth received 7
per cent of incomes, about the same as the top one per cent.
Comparison with income distribution in 1950, suggests that income distribution
among tax-payers is becoming less equally distributed.
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TABLE 5:
CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1950 - 1966.
1950 1966 CHANGE
Top
Top
Top
Top
Bottom
Bottom
Bottom
1%
5%
10%
20%
20%
30%
50%
8%
25%
34%
52%
7%
12%
25%
7%
16%
42%
52%
4%
8%
20%
-1%
-3%
+8%
-
-3%
-4%
-5%
These proportions are rough percentages due to the
difficulty of correlating whole percentages exactly.
In 1965, the top one per cent received about the same proportion of incomes as they
did in 1950 - 7 per cent compared with 8 percent, but the share received by poorest
groups declined quite markedly. The share of the poorest 20 per cent declined from
7 per cent of incomes to 4 per cent; the poorest 30 per cent from 12 per cent to 8
per cent, and the poorest 50 per cent from 25 per cent to 20 per cent. In 1966,
the top one per cent received about the same as the bottom 30 per cent and nearly
double the income of the bottom 20 per cent, but the real beneficiaries of the change
in income distribution of tax-payers would seem to have been the top 10 per cent
rather than the very rich. The top 10 per cent increased their share of income
from 34 per cent to 42 per cent. Put another way, the top one per cent declined
from having 8 times the share of income they would if incomes were equally distributed
to 7 times this share. The top 10 per cent increased from 3j to 4 times their
equal share.
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FIGURE 1 : INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1950 - 1966
i
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The bottom 30 per cent declined from having three-fifths to less than one-third of the
income they would receive if incomes were equally shared. Of course, the value of
these shares was probably increasing, but what seems to have been happening may be
compared to the process of squeezing a toothpaste tube from the bottom. The location
of the hand doing the squeezing and the toothpaste being squeezed are both out of
range of this paper, but it seems from this discussion that whatever benefits were
being gained by whites were accruing disproportionately in the upper rather than the
lower income groups. This does not mean that the poorer groups were becoming poorer
in absolute terms, nor is it necessarily the case that white tax-payers in the lower
income groups were losing. The report for 1950 does not differentiate between
different "racial" groups, and accordingly no distinction can be made. While "Africans"
constitute a negligible minority of any group assessed in 1966 (0.29 per cent of the
lowest group and 0.57 per cent of all persons assessed) they can be ignored as
insignificant. "Coloured" and "Asian" persons did however constitute quite a
sizable proportion of the poorest groups - 12.65 per cent of all persons assessed
and 13.96 per cent of the lowest income group. It is possible, therefore, that what
is in part being registered is the decline of an "Asian" petit-bourgeoisie under the
impact of the Group Areas Act and of "Coloured" workers as a result of job reservation.
12/...
-12-
The immediate effect of direct taxation should be briefly considered. Despite the
progressive character of taxation, it does not function to redistribute effective
income as far as I can make out. After deducting taxes and losses (i.e. giving loss
heavy groups a double benefit of the doubt), the top one per cent of individuals came
out with 6.8 per cent of incomes in 1965; the top 5 per cent with 17 per cent; and
the top 10 per cent with 27.8 per cent of incomes. The overall effect may best be
seen in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: THE EFFECT OF DIRECT TAXATION ON INCOME
DISTRIBUTION, 1966.
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax
The Lorenz curves for distribution of income before and after tax suggest that there
was little or no transfer of income as an effect of direct taxation. Indeed, aside
from a small benefit to the lowest income group - around a quarter of persons assessed,
it would seem that on the whole incomes were slightly redistributed upwards rather
than downwards.
Two additional effects would have to be considered before this point could be
decisively established. The first is the effect of indirect taxation which would
probably fall more heavily on poorer groups than on the wealthy. The second issue
is the effect of public expenditure on the distribution of resources among different
groups. I have not yet examined this issue, but the discussion of estates later in
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the paper lends credibility to the argument that the relative position of different
classes is not affected by any possible reallocation, though it is possible that the
mobility opportunities of particular groups of individuals might be affected by, for
instance, expenditure on education.
High incomes are closely connected with the possession of capital. Only 0.24 per
cent of persons assessed in 1966 who derived their incomes from employment had incomes
over R17,999 per annum, and such incomes constituted 1.23 of incomes from employment.
Income from employment provided 26.9 per cent of the incomes of the top income group,
compared with 82.4 per cent of the incomes of the lowest income group. By way of
contrast top incomes from investment — defined as interest, dividends, rents,
including royalties, and financial adventures — accounted for 18.1 per cent of all
investment incomes. Indeed the income on the investments of the top income group
counted 1.64 per cent of all incomes. More broadly, incomes from sources other than
employment enjoyed by groups with incomes over R10t000 per annum (amounting to 1.36
per cent of tax-payers) constituted 6.20 per cent of all incomes.
Investments as defined by the Revenue Department accounted for 45 per cent of the
incomes of the top income group, and averaged 30.9 per cent of incomes of more than
RIO,000. By way of contrast, groups earning less than R5,000 per annum gained on
average 5.6 per cent of their incomes from investments. The poorest income group
(under R600 per annum) drew 8.6 per cent of their incomes from investment, which
was more than any other group with incomes under R5,000 per annum. Presumably this
indicates a number of pensioners, widows, and similar groups, living on "investments"
like rents from property, savings and insurance — 88.4 per cent of the investment
\ income,group was derived from interest and rents on fixed property. Income from
dividends, which amounted to 6.7 per cent of the investment income of the top income
group, constituted only .01 per cent of the investment income of the lowest income
group.
The dead offer eloquent testimony on the distribution of property (as distinct from
incomes) among the living. Estates valued at R100,000 and over accounted for
26.5 per cent of the value of all estates of persons who died in 1965. Fixed
property, shares, and other expressions of property were highly concentrated in
the biggest estates:
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TABLE 6:
PROPORTION OF VALUE OF ALL ESTATES IN ESTATES OF R10O,OOQ AND OVER:
Urban immovable property 16.2 per cent
Agricultural or pastoral
immovable property 30.1
Rural immovable property 30.3
Cash 20.0
Claims in favour of estates 31.5
Government and municipal stock 44.4
Other movable property 27.2
Fiduciary, usufructury and other
like interest 23.6
Insurance policies 12.6
Donations by deceased 47.8
Other 22.1
All estates 26.5
Estates of over R100,000 constituted, on my somewhat rough calculation, something
between 1.0 and 1.5 per cent of all estates, and could not have exceeded 3.25 per
cent of all estates. This means that the wealthiest group enjoyed anything up
to 20 times their "equal share" of property overall, and certainly not less than
10 per cent of their "equal share". (The form in which the information on estates
is presented in the Revenue reports does not permit a precise calculation.)
In South Africa, as in other capitalist societies, property is the key to wealth.
The evidence of the class base of income inequalities may be supplemented by referring
to the earnings of white workers. Contrary to a myth popular among middle-class
whites, no significant group of white workers enjoyed top earnings. . Table 7 covers
a somewhat arbitrary sample of the wages of white workers in 1971. It is intended
to show the position of the labour aristocracy, skilled workers served by powerful
unions. Two groups of poorer workers — blockmen in the meat industry and operators
were included .for compacisow.
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As the wages referred to here are for September 1971, and are the weighted averages
of eight urban areas, any comparisons with the 1970 census exagerate their position
in the income structure. The translation of weekly wages into annual incomes to
facilitate comparisons with the census material may also exagerate earnings in that
it ignores fluctuations in earnings and the possibility of periods of unemployment.
Because these distortions may overstate earnings, the material clearly indicates
that the wages even of skilled workers fell into the middle and lower range of white
incomes.
The highest income group listed was R140 per week, and over (i.e. R728O per annum,
assuming continuous employment and a stable income over the period) but an almost
negligible proportion of workers attained such earnings. Only in the case of
boilenaakers did more than 2 per cent of incomes exceed R140 per week, and in most
trades the proportion was lower than one per cent.
TABLE 7:
WEEKLY WAGES OF WHITE MALE ARTISANS, SEPTEMBER 1971:
-R50 R50- R60- R70- R80- R90- R100- R110- R120- R130- +R140
59 69 79 89 99 109 119 129 139
fitter & Turner
Welder
Soilermaker
Blacksmith
Sheetmetal worker
-foulder
Patternmaker
Electrician
+ Building trades (a)
V ' .Printing
j ourneymen
lachinist
Operator
ilockman
1.3
3.4
2.0
3.4
4.8
6.4
4.1
2.3
2.5
2.8
9.8
19.6
45.6
4.4
8.9
4.3
8.7
6.8
13.1
6.8
6.3
5.8
6.1
15.3
22.4
28.8
8.2
17.7
10.2
12.6
12.8
17.1
8.4
15.9
11.2
11.5
21.4
28-6
17.5
14.4
20.7
14.8
15.1
21.3
19.5
26.1
28,2
19.2
16.2
16.8
15.6
6.1
18.5
15,6
17.5
16.9
27.5
16,2
19.6
24.7
20.9
17.0
12.8
9,3
1.6
18,6
13.5
15.6
12.9
16.7
12.7
15.8
14.0
22.9
16.1
10.4
4.5
0.4
13.2
8.2
14.7
11.1
4.7
5-5
9.5
4.2
11.6
12.3
If SI I •*•
vine
3UUt
8.5
4.9
9.5
7.7
3.5
4.8
5.7
2.4
2.7
8.2
3.5
7.1
3.2
6.3
6.3
1.2
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.2
5.6
2.0
3.9
2.5
3.0
5.3
0.1
1.8
0.5*
1.7
4.2
-
1.9
1.4
2.1
-
-
0.9
0.7
0.3
-
-
X Over R135
XX Over R 95
XXX Over R 90
(a) Carpenter, bricklayers/plasterer, painter, plumber.
Source: Reports on Labour Statistics, 1971.
Although earnings in different trades varied considerably, something like three-
quarters of workers, even in the best-paid occupations, had wages below R110 per
week (i.e. R572O a year.) A significant proportion of workers in each trade,
ranging from one-third of fitters and turners to nine-tenths of blockmen in the
meat industry received less than R80 per week (R41O8 per annum.)
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Two main points are apparent. No workers had earnings approximating to RIO,000
a year in 1971. The clear implication is that the 1.30 per cent of employees
with earnings in this income bracket in 1970 were professional or administrative
workers. The widely-held belief that white workers enjoy top incomes is sustained
by the likelihood that a number of self-employed tradesmen - building and plumbing
contractors, for instance - who do earn top incomes, had backgrounds in the relevant
trades.
It is however possible to exagerate the extent to which such groups constitute a
sizable or secure component of the upper classes. The category headed "construction"
in the Revenue report for 1966 included a fair sample of this group - for instance,
construction, plumbing, and glazing contractors. Only 21.7 per cent of this category
had incomes over R5,000 per annum, and A.00 per cent had incomes over R10,000 per
annum. Forty-three of them - 0.5 per cent - had incomes of more than R17,999 per
annum. This tiny minority enjoyed, however, 4.10 per cent of the total income of
the group. (By comparison, top incomes from financial ventures, including stock-
broking and underwriting, were enjoyed by 48 individuals, but these constituted
nearly a quarter of individuals gaining incomes from such ventures.) But in any
case, mobility out of wage employment does not affect the basic structure of
rewards for the workers that remain.
The second point to be made is that only a small proportion of workers in the
occupations referred to fall into the lowest white income group. Only a very
small minority of the most poorly paid group of workers referred to in Table 7
received less than R35 per week (R182O per annum). While the wages of blockmen
and operators were much lower than artisans in the engineering and building industry,
they nevertheless earned more than the bottom 20 per cent of white wage and salary
earners.
Before trying to identify some of these groups, it is perhaps worth repeating the
caution that these figures might be inflated. But they are not likely to be
grossly inflated. Below artisans lies a group comprising nearly one-fifth of
the gainfully active, whose earnings in 1970 fell below R1200 a year.
Part of this group no doubt consists of the walking casualties of industrial
society: the blind, people whose earnings were affected by ill-health, alcoholism,
etc., the partially disabled, as well as marginal groups like ex-prisoners. Others
with very low earnings are probably immigrant shop assistants, who exist in a
parochial complex stretching into the eastern Mediterranean and Portugal's former
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African empire. Others again are probably the newly-employed and part-time
workers, working students and schoolchildren and so on. But the most significant
group among them are women.
Overall, the incomes of women recorded in the census were lower than men. Women,
constituting nearly one-third of the gainfully employed, made up more than half of
the lowest income group, but just over 2 per cent of the top income group, and this
pattern was reflected over the whole range of incomes. Whereas only 5 per cent of
men had earnings less than R1200 a year, 42 per cent of women fell into this category.
The pattern of discrimination against white women is reflected even more markedly
in the degree to which they were excluded from authority positions in the economy.
Women constituted 31.76 per cent of employees, but only 8.55 per cent of employers.
"J Only 2.42 per cent of employees in the highest income group were women.
The second aspect of income distribution which is noteworthy is the relative poverty
of the rural areas compared with urban areas. According to the 1970 census, fewer
than 10 per cent of urban employees but 13 per cent of rural employees earned less
than R800. Correspondingly 1.00 per cent of urban employees, but only 0.86 per
cent of rural employees earned RIO,000 and above. Where 13.59 per cent of urban
employers were in the top income bracket, only 9.68 per cent of rural employers
earned top incomes. The implications of this comparison becomes clearer when it
is recognised that wealth is extraordinarily highly concentrated in agriculture.
The second report of the Commission of Inquiry into Agriculture
(RP 84 of 1970) illustrates the remarkable concentration of agricultural value in
) a tiny minority of farms. The report classifies farming units according to their
2
gross value of sales in 1962/63. It shows that 1.1 per cent of farming units
had gross sales valued at more than R50,000 (averaging R80,000), fltid accounted for
14.1 per cent of the total gross value of sales. Farms with sales grossing more
than RIO,000 comprised 16.4 per cent of farming units and accounted for 65.2 per
cent of all gross sales. At the other end of the scale, 36.5 per cent of farms
had gross sales of under R2,000 - 4.5 per cent of all gross sales. A somewhat
nebulous footnote to the table in which the Commission records these statistics
suggests that the smallest gross sales came from small-holdings. While conceptions
of what small means is relative to what big means, the average area of the farms
with gross sales under R200 was 203 morgen. There was, however, a connection
between size and gross sales: farms grossing over R50,000 had an average area of
3,647 morgen.
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These figures refer to the number of farming units, not to the number of farmers,
so it does not offer direct evidence of the concentration of wealth. Once again,
the Revenue reports offer clarity. Income distribution in agriculture, notwith-
standing the immense losses of the top income group were sharply concentrated -
the half per cent of agriculturists with earnings over R17,999 in 1966 received
nearly 4 per cent of incomes. Individuals with incomes over R7,000 constituted
6.66 per cent of persons assessed, and gained 28.07 per cent of incomes. Just
under 80 per cent of individuals assessed received under R38OO - 43.96 per cent
of incomes. The bottom half had incomes under R1600 and 15 per cent of all
incomes.
Read in conjunction with the material on farming units, this seems to add up to
a picture of wealth very highly concentrated in a tiny minority of individuals.
Before leaving agriculture, it is worth noting several features which add a
certain picquancy to its political sociology and which may go some way in explaining
the functions of an ideology which renders class invisible. On looking through
the income distribution of particular economic regions in the 1970 census, it is
noteworthy that high incomes are very thinly spread. In many regions, the number
of individuals with incomes of RIO,000 and over are tiny minorities. The power
of such individuals is enormously enhanced by the fact that they are small in
number.
At the same time, the potentiality of conflict between classes is also obviously
a problem. Two levers of consensus would seem to be available. The one lies
in the institutions of the community - church, party, cultural organisation -
which serve as a direct forum for moulding brotherly relationships in a community r
in which property is the key to wealth and power. The other would appear to lie in the
constraints which are available whea access to a very small number of jo^s ca? be con-
trolled from a single centre. It is often the case that rural industry provides a link
between agricultural property and industry processing'agricultural produce, e.g. :in the
canning industry agricultural cooperatives virtually control employment opportunities
in small tOTnis.
The concentration of wealth in urban situations is not very different in gross terms.
In rural areas, however, the stark contours of a social structure based almost
exclusively on land, contrasts with the urban situation where mobility opportunities
are more available, and where the sheer complexity of economic and social structure
tends at once to modify and conceal the distinctions between different classes.
These factors probably go some way to explaining different ideological patterns.
In urban areas, ideology does not obliterate the class structure in popular
consciousness, but rather rationalises and justifies it in terms of promises of
improvement to the energetic and the able. Such promises cannot be fulfilled
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except in a token form, but they are plausible enough to explain why the maps of
reality traced out by the folk mythologists of urban capitalism exhibit and extol,
rather than conceal some of its contours. (The opprobrium currently being visited
on a Johannesburg property tycoon who has the temerity to sail as close to the wind
as possible provides an instructive instance of the defensive mechanisms which come
into play when property reveals its unacceptable face.)
-3-
The preceding analysis would seem to support the view that racism does not generate
equality among the privileged racial minority. During the period 1950-1966, racial
privileges were systematically entrenched without effecting any significant changes
in the distribution of income or of wealth among whites. Indeed it is possible
that the poorest classes might have deteriorated relative to the richest, though
this has not been adequately demonstrated here.
It is perfectly true that the incomes of whites relative to blacks increased
considerably over the same period. There are, however, important implications
to be drawn about the political relations in the white community which might be
overlooked by concentrating exclusively on this aspect of the gap in wealth. Many
popular analyses of "the" income gap assert that the incomes of whites are four
or six or eight (or whatever) times those of blacks. This kind of analysis,
valuable though it may be in delineating one important aspect of racist societies,
may be positively misleading in the interpretation of white political structure.
Among other things, it ignores the class base of wealth in the country (including
the wealth, or lack of it of blacks.)
By suppressing the inequalities among whites and the source of these inequalities in
the class structure, the central dimension of inequality is hidden from view. What
stands out from the analysis of the upper slopes of the pyramid of wealth is the
structural base of inequality. "Perfect" racial equality is conceivable in a
form which would not in any sense modify this structure.
i The continuing sharp inequalities in the white community reinforce the impetus
towards maintaining racial privilege and hence the racism which continues to be
manifested in political expressions. White men measure themselves against other
white men, not against other racial groups. In the absence of any general tendency
towards equality, their main prospects for "advancement", given the framework of
capitalism, would seem to lie in excluding blacks from effective political and
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and economic rights. Keeping up with the Joneses would seem to be a more
effective target when interpreted as keeping the Tshabalalas down, and the
machinery for such repression has incidental advantages for the Joneses of
keeping intact the sacred institutions of capital. Whatever potential has
existed for an assault on capital has been transformed into a claim to a
privileged bargaining position in the market.
Even those aspects of racial society which probably confer a benefit on lower
class whites relative to the rich have the effect of reinforcing the institutions
of capitalism. . The most important of these is the (probably) high degree of
inter-generational mobility that is available to particular groups. It was
suggested earlier that white workers probably do not enjoy the high degree of
mobility, either intra-generational or inter-generational, which is sometimes ,
assumed. But there are probably other groups - e.g. teachers, clerical workers,
and government servants - who enjoy opportunities for some upward mobility.
Others again, like traders, and particularly liquor dealers may enjoy benefits
through bringing political resources into play - access to licensing boards and
group areas boards may be real levers to wealth which may explain the redistri-
bution of incomes from the top one per cent to the top ten per cent. All these
serve, of course, to provide capitalism with a broader base among whites.
There are other ways in which capitalist institutions are entrenched and the
capitalist ethic emboldened. The conversion of potential assaults on capital
into claims on privilege makes possible the simulacrum - without its substance -
of a welfare state. The possibility of entrenching whites in jobs and of increasing
white wages have served to reduce pressures towards the development of a welfare (
state in that demands for unemployment benefits and a broad range of social services
are rendered otiose. It is interesting that the most publicised response to the
crisis of the early seventies has been a weak form of populist consumerism.
Admittedly, on the experience of Britain and other welfare states, welfare
institutions would not necessarily involve any significant redistribution of income
between classes. But in such states, the rhetoric of equality poses some danger
to the ideological hegemony of capitalism.
A.W. Stadler
Department of Political Studies
University of the Witwatersrand
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FOSTSCRIPT:
After completing this paper I began reading Christopher Jencks, et al, Inequality,
the study of American education. I found it clarified some of the assumptions I
made in the paper, and also offered me a justification for looking at inequalities
among whites which I had not thought of except in terms of the rather thread-bare
notions of "relative deprivation". It also contradicts some other assumptions.
"During the 196O's, many reformers devoted enormous effort to equalising
opportunity. More specifically they tried to eliminate inequalities
) based on skin colour, and to a lesser extent on economic background.
They also wanted to eliminate absolute deprivation: 'poverty*, 'ignorance',
'powerlessness', and so forth. But only a handful of radicals talked
about eliminating inequality per se —There was no significant effort.,
to make taxation more progressive, and very little effort to reduce wage
disparities between highly paid and poorly paid workers. Instead,
attention focussed on helping workers in poorly paid jobs move into
better paid jobs. ...Even in the political arena, 'maximum feasible
participation1 implied mainly that more 'leaders1 should be black and
poor, not that power should be more equally distributed between
leaders and followers." (pp. 3-4)
"Consider the case of equal opportunity. One can equalise the
opportunities available to blacks and whites without equalising
anything else, and considerable progress was made in this direction
during the late 1960's. But equalising the opportunities available
to different children of the same race is far more difficult..."
(p. 4)
J "During the Depression, many people could not afford indoor plumbing
and 'got by1 with a privy. Those who could not afford an indoor toilet
ended up in buildings with broken toilets. , For this they paid more than
their parents had paid for privies. Examples of this kind suggest that
the 'cost of living1 is not the cost of buying some fixed set of goods and
services. It is the cost of participation in a social system. The cost
of participation depends in large part on how much other people habitually
spend to participate. Those who fall far below the norm, whatever it may
be, are excluded. It follows that raising the incomes of the poor will
not eliminate poverty if the incomes of other Americans rise even faster.
If people with incomes less than half the national everage cannot afford
what 'everyone' regards as 'necessities', the only way to eliminate poverty
is to make sure everyone has an income at least half the average. This
line of reasoning applies to wealth as well as poverty. The rich are
not rich because they eat filet mignon or own yachts... .The rich are rich
because they can afford to buy other people's time...These are not
privileges that become more widely available as people become more affluent.
If the distribution of income becomes more equal....the number of people who
are rich in this sense of the term will decline, even though absolute
incomes are rising. (pp« 5-6)
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" we have virtually nothing to say about the very rich...Such
people do not show up in most surveys, and their incomes have
a negligible effect on statistical analyses of income distribution
This does not mean they are unimportant. It simply means their
contribution to inequality in America is more political than
economic." (p. 13)
FOOTNOTES:
1. Cf. for instance, Leo Kuper, Race, Class and Power, especially
"Theories of revolution and race relations", and "Race, Class
and Power: Some comments on revolutionary change"; S.J. Morse
and S. Peele, "The white electorate as a potential source of
political change in South Africa: An empirical assessment",
in S.J. Morse and C. Orpen, Contemporary South Africa;
H.W. van der Merwe et. al., White South African Elites.
2. Table 4.1, P. 30 of the Commission of Inquiry into Agriculture
